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Abstract 
Understanding beyond language: perceiving meaning in 
reality 
This article is an attempt to develop a counter-argument to the 
contention that meaning is bound by language. Locating itself 
within the realist ontology of language developed by Saint 
Anselm of Canterbury, it will be argued that language com-
prises representations of entities perceived both extra to the 
perceiver and through introspection. Thus, a language game 
cannot be a closed system in the sense that by its very 
existence representations of extralinguistic being are contained 
therein. If truth is defined as that which is the case, the task of 
the perceiver becomes apprehension of being beheld without 
the cloud imposed by symbols: representations are not what 
they represent, instead they serve as windows onto a view of 
what is. Following exploration of psychological studies on 
contemplation, it is argued that it is in desymbolised moments 
of attentive awareness of being that meaning, unfiltered by the 
representativeness of language (and indeed, other symbolic 
systems), can arise. It will be proposed that in contemplative 
traditions, being is not reduced in perception, and the moment 
of meaning comes to the fore in the engagement and encounter 
with being.  
Opsomming 
Begrip verby taal: gewaarwording van betekenis in die 
werklikheid 
Hierdie artikel is ‟n poging om ‟n teenargument te ontwikkel vir 
die standpunt dat betekenis ingeperk word deur taal. Deur die 
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argument binne die werklikheidsontologie van Sint Anselmus 
van Canterbury te plaas, sal geargumenteer word dat taal 
representasies bevat van entiteite wat buite die waarnemer en 
ook deur introspeksie waargeneem word. ‟n Taalspeletjie kan 
dus nie ‟n geslote sisteem wees sodat deur sy blote bestaan 
representasies van buite-linguistiese syn daarin vervat is nie. 
Indien waarheid gedefinieer word as dit wat is, word die taak 
van die waarnemer bewuswording van syn sonder die wolk wat 
deur representasie opgelê word. Representasies of simbole is 
nie dit wat hulle voorstel nie; hulle dien eerder as vensters op 
dit wat is. In die lig van psigologiese studie oor nadenke word 
geargumenteer dat ongesimboliseerde oomblikke van aan-
dagtige bewustheid van syn, betekenis na vore laat kom wat nie 
deur die representatiewe aard van taal (en inderdaad ook ander 
simboliese stelsels) gefiltreer is nie. Die stelling word gemaak 
dat in kontemplatiewe (nadenkende) tradisies die syn nie ge-
reduseer word tot gewaarwording nie, en dat die oomblik van 
betekenis na vore kom in die betrokkenheid by en die ont-




This work explores the obstacle that language-bound humans face 
that renders them unable to grasp reality unhampered by the limits 
of linguistic categorisation. The aim is to counter the now common-
place assumption that language mirrors reality, rather than directing 
humans into being through transcendence of the symbolic system. 
The language-bound argument opposes the contemplative expe-
rience wherein unity with being is obtained. It is the latter for which 
this article ultimately argues. As an exercise in multidisciplinary re-
search the boundaries of the author‟s research will be formed by 
philosophy, theology, linguistics and cognitive science. 
The work proceeds by an analysis of the problem. The ontology that 
will be employed, that of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, will be the lens 
through which the study is carried out. His realist ontology will be 
explained prior to our consideration of various “language-bound” 
positions (among these Lakoff, Johnson, Rorty and Fodor). The ar-
gument will thence be proposed that human beings are not “lan-
guage-bound” due to language‟s evocative nature and the structure 
of language games. Instead, the extralinguistic partial apprehension 
of reality will be argued for. 
                                      
1 The author acknowledges the constructive comments of Hildegard van Zweel, 
Department of Linguistics, UNISA throughout the development of this article. 
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1.1 Background 
Saint Anselm‟s realist ontology draws attention to the complex rela-
tionship between reality and language. In his philosophical thinking, 
truth is located in the existence (being) of the signified, rather than in 
the signifier (symbol/representation). Anselmian realism posits an 
ontological separation between signifier and signified.  
If it is indeed the case, this ontological separation could restrict hu-
man linguistic activities to language games with meanings esta-
blished by practice, rather than in correspondence to extra-linguistic 
being. 
1.2 Problem statement 
In the light of Saint Anselm‟s proposition that language can never 
provide humans with an adequate account of truth or being, as truth 
is only contained in the entity of which the symbol is but a 
representation, an important question arises. To what extent are hu-
man beings “bound” by language? Research into this question will 
assist in determining to what degree truth or being can be obtained 
by humans. If language indeed has its limits of explanation, alternate 
paths of access to being need to be sought. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The argument will be made that, although human experience is 
partially informed by language, the evocative nature of language 
aids in directing the employer of the linguistic entity beyond the con-
fines of linguistic categorisation. In this process the human being is 
able to capture truth/being itself. Moreover, it will be proposed that 
an unmediated grasp of Truth/Being can only be achieved through 
contemplation. 
2. Saint Anselm’s realist theory of truth 
“When is a linguistic statement true?”2 A statement is true when it 
states what is the case (Anselm, 2000:165).3 Truth subsists in the 
                                      
2 This is a revision of the Anselmian question: “When is a statement true?” 
(Anselm, 2000:165.) 
3 We extend the meaning of “statement” to refer to mental representations 
perceived through sensory experience or through introspection developed into a 
collection of cognitive symbols. 
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truth of the case – object, event, or thought – signified by the state-
ment, and not in the statement that represents reality (Anselm, 
2000:166).4 An inductive inference is made when the nature of truth 
is deliberated: statements are always true when they signify what is 
rightly the case (Anselm, 2000:168).5 Whatever is rightly the case is 
that which exists (Anselm, 2000:168-170, 173). Therefore an entity 
is rightly signified when what is signified is the being of the entity 
(Anselm, 2000:174).  
If a statement is declared true, it directly claims that the signified 
exists.6 Consequently, we should ponder the cause of existence, 
that is, the cause of the statement‟s truth. Anselm places truth in the 
context of the cause (or source) of all that is. If the supposition is 
made that truth had both a beginning and an end in time, it would be 
true to argue that truth existed neither before or after its existence 
(Anselm, 2000:164-165).  
... [E]ven before truth came to be, it would have been true that 
there was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it 
would still be true that there would be no truth. But it could not 
be true without truth. (Anselm, 2000:165.)  
To propose that truth exists when truth is not, is contradictory. 
Hence, Anselm concludes: “… truth cannot be confined by any 
beginning or end ...” (Anselm, 2000:165). Truth has an eternal na-
ture because if at any moment one can declare a statement to be 
true, truth exists. The truth of a statement is conditional upon its 
stating the case. If truth is eternal the cause of the truth must be 
eternal, too (Anselm, 2000:180). This cause of truth lies not in the 
temporal entity signified in the representation of the statement 
(which is only true in as much as the temporal entity exists), but in 
truth as an eternal entity.7  
                                      
4 “[T]he truth of something true is in that true thing. But the thing stated is not in 
the true statement, and thus must not be called its truth; rather, it must be called 
the cause of the statement‟s truth.” (Anselm, 2000:165.) 
5 That is if they signify what is, is, and what is not, is not (Anselm, 2000:168). 
6 Following the definition of truth as that which rightly signifies. 
7 This abstraction emphasises that a true statement (i.e. a statement which rightly 
signified what is in fact the case) cannot but be true and is always true in so 
much as it participates in truth. “... [I]f truth could in no respect fail to be in this 
statement (given the statement), then it follows that Truth which is the supreme 
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It can be argued from the relativist perspective that there are 
multiple irreconcilable truths, rather than a singular eternal truth 
(Anselm, 2000:187).8 Many independent “rightnesses” (truths in sig-
nification) would direct to the existence of multiple entities which are 
rightly signified in true significations, true by their representing what 
is (Anselm, 2000:187).  
In response, however, it can be said that the existence of the 
particular entity signified is not contingent upon the signification 
(Anselm, 2000:188). Even if the signification does not occur, this 
does not remove the potential for a right signification to occur: 
rightness continues to be (Anselm, 2000:188). Rightness exists not 
in the signification made, but the signification may be said to be right 
(truthful) because it is made in accordance with being (Anselm, 
2000:188). From an Anselmian perspective being is located prior to 
perception, signification, and understanding. Being has the potential 
to be signified and exist, regardless of whether or not the signi-
fication is made. Hence, while there may be many particular truths 
(rightnesses in significations) that the signification does not alter, the 
rightness of the entity logically entails that truth is not rightness in 
terms of signification, but rightness in terms of the being of the 
phenomenon signified (Anselm, 2000:189). The rightness empha-
sised by St. Anselm transcends particularities, for it is not so much 
concerned with signification but with the abstract concept of 
rightness. In referring to truth as representative of what is, Anselm 
declares “... the rightness of all things ... is one and the same” 
(Anselm, 2000:189).9 Moreover, if the rightness of things is one it is 
necessarily the case that in these truth is to be found (Anselm, 
2000:190). 
                                                                                                             
cause of this statement‟s truth cannot be understood to have an end” (Anselm, 
2000:180). 
8 “For when what is is signified to be, or when what-is-not is signified not to be, 
then the signification is correct, or right, and (assuredly) rightness exists without 
which the signification could not be right.” (Anselm, 2000:187.) 
9 Anselm, 2000:189: 
... if it is only when things are in accordance with what they ought to 
be that rightness is in those things which ought to have it, and if for 
them to be right is only [for them to be in accordance with what they 
ought to be], then it is evident that the rightness of all these things is 
only one. 
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From a scriptural perspective, God is truth (Anselm, 2000:164).10 
Could God as truth thus be affirmed as in all things which are true 
(in all that is) (Anselm, 2000:164)? Anselm unapologetically 
identifies God as the “Supreme Truth”, and with this delineation 
providing for him the truest understanding of the nature of truth 
(Visser & Williams, 2004:204-205). Whatever is, is true, and 
whatever is true is so only because it participates in what truth is – 
rightness (Anselm, 2000:174). The assumption made from the 
definition of God as truth, is that all that is, is contingent upon the 
Supreme Truth (Visser & Williams, 2004:210). This – Being itself – is 
uncaused, for there can never be a moment when a truth was not 
true in that if the statement‟s truth always is, then the cause of the 
statement‟s truth must always exist (Anselm, 2000:180).11 Never-
theless, the issue of the existence of the Supreme Truth remains. 
There is no empirical evidence for its existence, yet without a causal 
matrix, is there reason for the existence of anything?  
Anselm‟s theory of truth, while theological, guides our attention to an 
important philosophical problem: “… few consider the truth which is 
in the being of things” (Anselm, 2000:177-178). Truth is extended to 
being through the argument that, by existing, entities reveal truth: 
“… by the very fact that they are, they declare that they ought to be” 
(Anselm, 2000:178-179). This is a meta-analysis of the individual 
truth signification whereby an abstraction is created to understand 
truth. Indeed, Anselm draws a universal conclusion from his move-
ment of individual signification to truth in being, and being‟s con-
tingency. He proposes that  
[r]ectitude does not depend on the things in which there is 
rectitude: there is one never-failing, unchangeable rectitude for 
all things in which we say there is truth or rectitude (Visser & 
Williams, 2004:217).  
If rightness of the signified does not depend upon the signifier but 
rather on truth as being, then an ontological separation exists be-
                                      
10 See John 14:6. As an article of faith God‟s identification as “truth” is possible to 
reason over while remaining improvable. If truth is defined as rightness where 
rightness resides in signification of what is, i.e. being, the God who is identified 
with truth is intimately connected with the problem of existence: the 
metaphysical question of the contingency of everything that is returns, and the 
God who is truth is conceived as the ground of all being. 
11 “Indeed, the truth of the statement could not always be unless its cause always 
were.” (Anselm, 2000:180.) 
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tween what signifies (e.g. the word [symbol] apple), and the object of 
the signification (e.g. an apple). What signifies – in this instance the 
word-symbol – and the reality being signified are not the same. 
While apple leads to understanding of a particular component of 
reality if rightly signified, it does not reveal (without further explo-
ration) the fullness of the apple‟s “apple-ness” – all that forms its 
identity, such as greenness, crispness, tartness, et cetera – which 
collectively make up rightly what the apple is. What determines the 
apple‟s truth is the “… rightness which always exists …” (Anselm, 
2000:188-189).12 Visser and Williams (2004:219) succinctly sum up 
Anselm‟s theological theory of truth: 
Something has rectitude because it accords with its purpose. 
Something receives its purpose from whatever caused it. God 
causes all things. So whatever is said to be true is true in virtue 
of being caused by God in accordance with his will, and God is 
Truth because He causes all things ...13 
While one may disagree with the faith foundation of the argument 
which fails without the signification of God as truth, Visser and 
Williams highlight the ontological nature of truth for which Anselm is 
arguing. Anselm challenges us to comprehend what is held as true 
as more than what is declared in linguistic categorisation of 
phenomena. For him, truth exists only because it has being rather 
than because it is perceived and categorised by the agent (Visser & 
Williams, 2004:219). 
3. Are human beings language-bound? 
Anselm‟s realist ontology directs beyond symbolic systems. Contrary 
to this point of view are arguments wherein language is proposed to 
be in sum what can be known – the only means through which 
anything can be known, or the human being‟s experience of reality 
as indubitably filtered by the linguistic categories at our disposal. We 
identify these as language-bound arguments. 
                                      
12 “The rectitude or truth of signification does not have its being through 
signification but is altogether independent of signification.” (Visser & Williams, 
2004:216.) 
13 Where “purpose” refers to that “... all things are what they ought to be” (Anselm, 
2000:174). 
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3.1 Language-bound arguments 
3.1.1 Lakoff and Johnson 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that the human being‟s employment of 
concepts and categories in language emerges from the human 
being‟s embodied, subjective experience of reality (Lakoff & John-
son, 1999:17). Meaning has its origin in the embodied form: only 
through the body can perception and comprehension of self and 
environment occur (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:17). Is it, therefore, 
implied that what is real is only that which has been filtered by our 
embodied perception (and, by extension, through linguistically 
grounded understanding)? 
For Lakoff and Johnson, without the categorisation of what is 
experienced outside the self, from the perspective of the self, even 
the amoeba would not be able to discern the nutritious from the not 
nutritious (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:17).14 Categorisation – the divi-
sion of reality into understandable chunks – is fundamental to sur-
vival (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:18). Hence,  
[w]e cannot, as some meditative traditions suggest, „get 
beyond‟ our categories and have a purely uncategorized and 
unconceptualized experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:19). 
Language is possible because of the conceptual structure made 
available to humans from perceptual categorisation (Lakoff & John-
son, 1999:21). But can Lakoff and Johnson‟s argument be ac-
cepted?15 It is important to keep in mind that the real is more than 
what the human being categorises, for the human being is only part 
of what is. If perception limits the knowable, is that sufficient a 
foundation to assert that the real is not? The authors clarify:  
... human concepts are not just reflections of an external reality, 
but ... are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially 
by our sensorimotor system (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:22; italics 
– CDS). 
Lakoff and Johnson‟s position is weakened in qualifying that con-
cepts – the product of human perception – are partially the fruit of 
experience of an external reality. This reality transcends the human 
                                      
14 The assumption is made that the amoeba can discern and has self awareness. 
15 “Our categories of things in the world determine what we take to be real: trees, 
animals, people, buildings, and so on.” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:21.) 
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being, for in its perception there is correspondence between per-
ceiver and object perceived. While the perceptual information is 
somewhat the result of the human embodied state – which includes 
language – the human being‟s conception of what is real is not the 
sole product of humanity‟s systems of categorisation, such as 
language.  
Agreed, “for real human beings, the only realism is an embodied 
realism” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:26). However, this should be car-
ried into the broader context of the human being. Individual 
conception of reality is not the only conception: commonalities exist 
between individual perceptions, as evident in communication where 
shared understandings emerge. Still, the individual‟s understanding 
is always from the subjective perspective which includes the cultural, 
linguistic, social, religious, historical and political background of the 
perceiver. In an act of shared meaning, there is a synthesis of both 
the subjective and the intersubjective. Moreover, in perception an 
interaction arises relating the subjective experience of reality with 
the external reality itself. A form of clarified realism should be em-
braced: the “real” – as perceived – has multiple dimensions; the 
individually perceived (subjective) and that of which the individual is 
but one dimension (objective). Here then, the discussion of the “real” 
takes into cognisance both the subjective, epistemological dimen-
sion of human experience, and the fundamental, ontological 
component of reality.  
If all that can be known is from the embodied, subjective perspec-
tive, is it implied that the individual perceiver has a privileged per-
ceptual position? Some varieties of subjectivism argue that shared 
meanings are impossible. C.I. Lewis (1929:116), for instance, 
claimed that “... knowledge or the communication of ideas is dubious 
or impossible in the light of the subjectivity of sense”. Wilder ex-
plains that, since for Lewis meanings are considered as “... abstract 
mental entities ...” there is no surety of the sharedness of meanings 
(Wilder, 1971:27).16 Lewis conceptualised meaning as present in 
individual experiences (knowledge and thoughts) as well as in 
words. Moreover, he understood meaning as specifically present in 
concepts, though it is in terms of concepts that he introduces the 
communal dimension of meanings in defining a concept as the 
                                      
16 It should be noted, however, that embodied realism does not take subjectivism 
to Lewis‟ extreme: shared meanings are possible, although always from the 
perspective of the subject. 
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particular variety of “... meaning which must be common to two 
minds when they understand each other ...” (Lewis, 1929:70). The 
subjectivist may argue that because meaning is an individual mental 
construct it is impossible to grasp what anyone else means entirely 
(Wilder, 1971:28). At a less extreme degree, meanings could only 
be shared partially by people who have similar characteristics, con-
texts, et cetera, thus remaining relativistic. The subjectivist and the 
relativist appear doomed to the consequences of closed language 
games. 
People brought up in different cultures will speak different 
language-games, with different rules from ours. They think of 
the world from within their own language and culture; in some 
cases they have different interests and values, in which cases 
their culture leads them to direct their attention to different sorts 
of things from those salient in our culture. (Kirk, 1999:98.) 
From within a language game truth is determined by what is ac-
cepted by the players of the game. Truth is consensus within a 
game, provided that truth is not determined by anything more than 
the game played (Kirk, 1999:98). 
3.1.2 Rorty 
Building on the later Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson, Richard 
Rorty agrees with the removal of “... the central presupposition of 
Philosophy ...” in terms of language, namely that sentences are true 
when they correspond with the way things are (Rorty, 1982:xviii). 
Rorty was particularly critical of theories which purport that the 
human mind is “a great mirror” in which representations of external 
(and internal) realities are accurately or inaccurately represented 
(Rorty, 1979:12). The assumption that representations are possible 
arises from the presupposition that knowledge of anything is 
achievable (Rorty, 1979:9). Regarding particular representations, 
such as linguistic terms, Rorty (1989:4) states: “... there is no sense 
in which any of these descriptions is an accurate representation of 
the way the world is in itself”. This is Wittgensteinian.17 Any repre-
sentation does not accurately represent the world-as-it-is to the 
employer of language (or any other cognitive system). The meaning 
is not rooted in “reality”, but in the convention of how the word is 
used (Rorty, 1989:4). “... [W]here there are no sentences there is no 
                                      
17 “[A] word hasn‟t got a meaning given to it as it were by a power independent of 
us. A word has a meaning someone has given to it.” (Wittgenstein, 1960:28.) 
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truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that 
human languages are human creations ...” necessitates for Rorty 
(1989:5) the fact that there is no truth outside the linguistic state-
ment.  
Only the players of language games, composed of sentences, can 
hence possess meaning (Rorty, 1989:18). It follows that meanings 
within language games function in closed systems whereby meaning 
is determined through consensus among players of the game, rather 
than correspondence to any dimension of “reality” external to the 
language game. Hence, Rorty removes the possibility of testing re-
presentations with extra-symbolic entities. If meaning is only pos-
sible within language games (and from language usage), languages 
can be compared with languages, but never with anything else 
(Rorty, 1989:20). 
If the mind is not a mirror capable of holding intrapersonal expe-
riences as well as representations of the reality external to the per-
ceiver, then Rorty‟s conclusion that meaning can only be contained 
within sentences as determined by the use of language, is perfectly 
sound. The language game is thus a closed system of reference. 
However, even in a reality wherein meaning is closed in language 
games there are multiple variables. In the first case, if there is 
shared meaning as a result of multiple players of a language game, 
it necessitates a context within which the game is played. Moreover, 
if the players of a language game have shared meanings, at what 
point do their experiences of their context cease and the closed 
language game begins (being played in isolation of the context)? 
The influence of the language game upon the context and more 
importantly for cognitive theories of representation, the influence of 
the context upon the language game seem not to be quite so 
apparent.  
The arbitrary assignment of labels to particular entities and expe-
riences from within language games does not have great relevance 
to the issue at hand. A relation between signifier and signified 
evolves through the usage of the term. With this one agrees. That 
the relation is arbitrary is for this study not fundamental. Rather, that 
the term comes to relate meaningfully to extralinguistic entities 
(whether internal or external to the perceiver) would indicate to 
some degree that language games are not completely closed 
systems in their occurring in relation to a broader context and in 
relation to related entities. 
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3.1.3 Fodor 
A further language-bound theory is that of Jerry Fodor (2000:53), 
who proposes the analogical argument that thought is language-like 
and thus representational. At the heart of Fodor‟s hypothesis is that 
a psychological model of cognition has to be representational, for 
“computation presupposes a medium of computation: a represen-
tational system” (Fodor, 2000:51). While this may beg the question, 
Fodor (2000:51) develops his theory starting from an ambitious at-
tempt to demonstrate that all mental processes have to occur within 
a representational system. 
The theory of the “Language of Thought” proceeds from a con-
sideration of the psychology of choice in an agent‟s moral decision-
making process: when an agent can represent possible situations, 
behaviours, and potential consequences to the self the agent can 
take a moral decision (Fodor, 2000:53). Moreover, within this repre-
sentation is also a judgement of the kind of behaviour which could 
be enacted; were this representation removed one could not explain 
the motivation for particular moral actions (Fodor, 2000:53). In this, 
Fodor (2000:53) discerns evidence of the computation of an agent‟s 
possible moral action occurring to the agent from within a repre-
sentational system, for without a representational system compu-
tation cannot occur. Indeed, he goes as far as declaring that “I might 
as well have said that the model presupposes language”, as Fodor 
(2000:53) draws out similarities which exist between representa-
tional systems and language.18 Firstly, an infinite number of 
representations form both part of a representational system and of 
language of which there is no limit to the possible number of repre-
sentations. Secondly, both reference to entities and truth regarding 
representations (significations) form part of the representational sys-
tem and of language (Fodor, 2000:53-54).19 In addition to moral 
decision-making, Fodor (2000:55) views concept-learning and per-
ception as computational and thus as representational processes. 
Concept-learning is representational, for in the grasping of a concept 
a phenomenon is considered and computed in addition to a 
relationship being developed between a phenomenon (stimulus) and 
                                      
18 The assumption of language is problematic, as without it the language of 
thought remains unproven and circular in argumentative nature. 
19 Fodor is defending a realist correspondence theory in his representational 
system: “... „D‟ describes what „a‟ refers to if („Da‟ is true if a is D)” (Fodor, 
2000:54). 
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the content of the representation (Fodor, 2000:55-56). Similarly, 
perception involves computation, for in the perceptual process re-
course is made to past experiences to grasp experienced pheno-
mena, because past experiences are projected onto what is per-
ceived and a reasonable choice is made in terms of available hypo-
theses (Fodor, 2000:59). 
[P]sychological processes are typically computational and 
computation presupposes a medium for representing the 
structures over which the computational operations are defined. 
(Fodor, 2000:63.)20 
The Language of Thought hypothesis describes the nature of 
thought as language-like. But, if language undergirds computation, 
is the argument that there is an objective way in which reality is 
apart from the perceiver negated by thoughts having a represen-
                                      
20 The Fodorian theory that all thoughts are computational finds its source in his 
development of a “Representational Theory of Mind” (RTM) and in the influence 
Turing‟s notion (“... that thinking is a kind of computation ...”) had upon Fodor 
(1998:10). Ontologically, mental representations precede propositional attitudes, 
while these in turn precede natural languages in terms of intentionality (Fodor, 
1998:7).  
[F]or each event that consists of a creature‟s having a propositional 
attitude with the content P (each such event as Jones‟s believing at 
time t that P) there is a corresponding event that consists of the 
creature‟s being related, in a characteristic way, to a token mental 
representation that has the content P (Fodor, 1998:8) 
 P could only be conceived as true if there is correspondence in the “tokening-of-
a-mental-representation” (Fodor, 1998:8). For the language statement to be, the 
constituting proposition must hold representational content (Fodor, 1998:9). 
 In keeping with his “Representational Theory”, Fodor (1998:10) conceives that 
all thoughts are computational. His (Fodor, 1998:9) reasoning relates to the 
aforementioned idea that propositional content requires a representational 
undergirding. This is because all cognitive representations are symbolic (in that 
they symbolise or represent an entity beyond the symbol), moreover, these “... 
symbols are physical objects with semantic properties” (Fodor, 1998:10). By 
“semantic properties” it is implied that symbols have meanings. Computations, 
then, for Fodor (1998:10) are the causal relationships between symbols, which 
continue to uphold the semantic properties of the symbols in relationship. The 
symbol of “red” is not a symbol which functions in isolation from others –
associations arise (Fodor, 1998:10). Hence, the symbol “red” is associated with 
the symbol “colour”, or perhaps with that of “blood”, through the computational 
process. The theory of thinking understood as computation only requires that 
symbols possess meaning such that relationships between other meaning-
bearing symbols can occur (Fodor, 1998:11). If, Fodor argues, a symbol is 
representational, it necessarily possesses semantic properties, and thus it will 
be able to be in relation to other symbols computationally. 
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tational structure? The Anselmian theory of truth emphasises onto-
logy over epistemology, for all knowledge is tainted in symbol.  
Fodor‟s Language of Thought hypothesis could add to the possibility 
of transcending language in such a way that one might have insight 
into being. If the only way through which one is able to exist as an 
embodied being is through and with thoughts that are structured in a 
linguistic manner, and if representations constrict ontology, then 
contemplative moments (which will be evidenced in the later psycho-
logical and linguistic studies) do in fact guide us to a better grasp of 
what is outside linguistic boundness. 
3.2 More than language 
While these are influential arguments, it can be argued that human 
beings are not language-bound. 
3.2.1 The evocative nature of language 
Rudolf Botha (2003:45-46) developed a non-reductionist ontology 
for language. Among the capacities which he affords language is its 
underlying of perception (Botha, 2003:206). Only through the human 
being‟s perceptual ability can understanding of the context within 
which the human being finds herself occur. If language plays a fun-
damental role in perception, then it is essential in terms of 
understanding the extralinguistic reality. As Chomsky (1982:6; italics 
– CDS) notes: 
... one can conceive of the study of language as being one 
possible paradigm for the investigation of the nature of 
knowledge, the nature of human knowledge, and the problems 
of a priori knowledge. 
Language is a single means to knowledge; there is more to being 
than language. This is upheld in embodied cognition models which 
theorise that language is supported by mental representations of 
experienced entities (Evans & Greene, 2006:240-241).  
During perception, symbols of neurons in sensory-motor 
regions of the brain capture information about perceived events 
in the environment and in the body. (Barsalou, 1999:582.)  
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The external reality is not only the context within which perception 
and language occur, but is prior to perception and cognition.21 
Experience of being does not end in representations that mediate 
perception of sensory experience, mental states and cognition.  As a 
symbolic representational system (cognition) language evokes the 
reality (that of which the players of the language game are a single 
part) to which the symbol points and by which the symbol is formed 
through perception (Spader, 1998).   
There is a prima facie difference between poppies, syringes, 
automobiles, human bodies, and so forth and the signifiers that 
designate and refer to them … The philosophical mistake of 
semiological reductionism is the systematic refusal to 
accommodate this prima facie difference within the sphere of 
human experience … the effects of the reduction culminate in a 
loss of the evocative … the capacity of language to awaken in 
ourselves the quality of another‟s experience (Dillon, 1995:166). 
The human being can never be totally language-bound when the 
linguistic entity employed relies on perception for the raw data which 
is employed for cognition to occur.  
[T]he purpose of an exclamation such as „See the green table!‟ 
is not to have the hearer repeat correctly the counters, see, 
green, and table, but to have him look in the same direction and 
to duplicate the experience of seeing a green table, whether in 
fact or in imagination. The truth is not in the statement but in the 
experience to which it directs us. The hearer has grasped the 
truth when he is in turn able to say, „I see it, too‟, not when he 
can repeat it correctly. (Kohak, 1984:64.)  
Language leads beyond its confines in its symbols having partial 
relation to extrasubjective entities. Yet, symbols are not the reality 
they represent. They are representations of real dimensions of rea-
lity interpreted by human beings in cognition, as informed by 
numerous influences.  
                                      
21 Perception is the capacity to process information from the senses and from 
states within the body, while cognition refers to the processes of perceptual 
information becoming accessible to the mind through the development of 
representations of perceptual information (Evans & Greene, 2006:240). The 
linguistic entity is one component of the process of cognition through which 
representations are formed. 
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3.2.2 The structure of language games 
When counter interpretations of the same phenomenon expressed 
in language games arise, so too does the problem of how the truth 
of any singular knowledge claim can be established. Kirk (1999) 
provides the example of two communities making opposing claims 
concerning the size of the sun relative to the moon. To measure the 
magnitude of either requires theories (i.e. cultural constructions), but 
the real is what conforms to particular cultural practices, as con-
tained in a language game. 
If the argument works, then truth and falsity, and with them 
reality itself, depend on what we think, on our point of view. So 
realism is wrong and we have to accept anti-realism. (Kirk, 
1999:99.) 
Problematic, however, is the scientific enterprises‟ continued test-
able advancement of what it is possible to know despite cultural 
affiliations. Results of scientific experimentation are not culturally 
relative, although interpretation may be. Remaining in cultural ghet-
tos of thought thence is a refusal to acknowledge the real for the 
sake of saving the language game‟s meaning. The accuracy of a 
scientific measurement is relevant only within the discourse of a 
particular scientific community‟s acceptability of these measure-
ments in its particular language game (Kirk, 1999:101). This implies 
that the language game played is done so in an extended 
understanding of culture, where the practice of science becomes the 
cultural group within which the game is played.  
If a particular science is construed as a language game, then the 
cultural limitations on the scientific endeavour necessitate that what 
is presented as reality is only real in terms of what is accepted by a 
particular group‟s convention (Kirk, 1999:101). The scientific experi-
ment in practise, however, counters this relativism. Science always 
attempts to unearth the way that things are through scientists‟ 
endeavouring, at the very least to aim for objectivity in their re-
search. Nevertheless, if science is nothing more than an extended 
language game, the human is trapped in a relativist quagmire. 
Nothing can be known about reality itself in that all meaning is 
constructed by players of the same language game. 
Language games do not exist or function without cause, context and 
components. For a language game to be played there is a logical 
requirement that players exist. Additionally, these players need to 
inhabit a context (Kirk, 1999:102). If a language game cannot be 
played by a player on his/her own – a game in this context implies 
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more than one player – then meanings are shared between players 
in terms of the language game context which they occupy. Infused 
within the language game argument is a reality that transcends the 
playing of the game of which the players are but a component (Kirk, 
1999:102). This context includes the limits and boundaries of the 
game played, a set of meanings shared by players of the game, and 
entities towards which the shared meanings relate.  
Proponents of antirealist language game arguments could retort that 
the previous argument originates in a culturally-constructed and 
communally-accepted language game itself (Kirk, 1999:102). How-
ever, this does not explain how it is possible that language games 
can be played within a particular context. The fact that a language 
game can occur implies that what is real is more than just language 
games. There are players, contexts, and entities which collectively 
mean something to players. Moreover, the existence of different lan-
guage games implies a multilayered reality, rather than a reality 
limited to consensus within a language game. Language games 
suggest the existence of a multifarious reality of which the language 
game is but a part, instead of a reality in which the language game 
is all that is. 
The context within which language games are played – the reality 
behind the game – can only be grasped without symbols in the 
attempt to apprehend without distortion. While the sum total of lan-
guage cannot be reduced to a system of symbolic cognitive repre-
sentations, language certainly does make use of these in words 
signifying dimensions of reality which are more than the symbols 
themselves. The apple is more than an abstract concept indepen-
dent from an entity, pointing as it does to a real entity. The relative 
language game that deems understanding as limited to the players 
of the game, in other words perceiving language as a closed 
system, is therefore questioned. Apprehension of the real is 
prevented without a realisation of the evocative nature of language 
that directs beyond the linguistic system (Spader, 1998). This rule of 
evocation is a position which, as we have determined, is unaccept-
able to those who can only find meaning within language (Rorty, 
1982:xx), or as St. Anselm (2000:165) who can only find truth in the 
extrasymbolic.  
The human experience as players of language games wherein 
meaning is partially constructed is still directed beyond the game. 
One understands what an apple is, not because language re-
presents what an apple is, but because linguistic categories provide 
access to the object existing externally to the player of a language 
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game. One does not, therefore, remain trapped in the representation 
(cognitive symbol) of the object but through the category expe-
riences it. It is to the reality of the apple that language directs the 
perceiver through the word-label. Therefore, the human experience 
of a reality beyond linguistic understanding – of truth beyond per-
ception – impels movement beyond the language game (Spader, 
1998).  
The argument has been put forward that humans partially cognate 
through language, which assists in directing beyond the linguistic 
system towards entities reflected within language. What is the 
nature of this reality that is to a degree conceived through the 
window of language? From the Anselmian framework it is fractional 
truth (as perceived and cognated) and objective truth (ontologically). 
Truth is related to the perceptual moment in that the signified is 
evoked by the signifier. If what is signified is related to the deve-
loped symbol, knowledge of what exists (signified) comes to the fore 
in the encounter between perceiver and perceived (what exists) in 
understanding (Barsalou, 1999:578).22 One of language‟s roles is – 
with other cognitive systems (e.g. sensory, emotive, etc.) – assis-
tance in comprehending being, using symbols as lenses to cognate. 
Hence, truth is an essential point of discussion for an ontology of 
language that takes heed of its cognitive role (cf. Botha, 2003:206). 
Anselm levels support to the position that understanding is not 
limited to language, indeed that symbolic representations point to 
entities transcending the system of symbols. In terms of the pre-
ceding discussion, Anselmian ontology – wherein truth is equated 
with being – does not imply that a symbolic representation cannot 
contain rectitude (i.e. correct signification), but that rectitude is not 
founded in the symbol. Hence, the extent of rectitude is not 
complete due to the symbol being a filtered representation of truth 
(e.g. words), rather than what is true in the particular entity being 
what it ought to be. The symbolic representation of the entity in the 
word symbol and the being of the entity comes to the fore. Anselm 
directs the reader to a middle ground between two metaphysics: 
                                      
22 Other dimensions of the linguistic phenomenon are not discounted, for instance 
language development through dialogue. In this article the focus is upon the role 
of language in perception and cognition. Thus, while language is socially 
formed, the beginning of perception for the individual perceiver can lie in the 
person‟s use of the socially and biologically formed linguistic entity. The concern 
is the encounter of the “I” with what is through the mediation of language in the 
development of cognitive representations. 
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realism and subjectivism. What should be argued for is a clarified 
and filtered realist comprehension where the possibility of partially 
knowing through symbolic systems is acknowledged, but also where 
the limits of what can be known as reflective of what is, are 
discerned as symbol of an entity, not the entity itself. 
4. Apprehending truth in contemplation 
Anselm has argued that, while what is signified may be true, the 
cause of truth is not in the signifier but in truth itself. If truth is not 
wholly contained in any particular representation of what is (e.g. in 
symbolic representations which undergird the linguistic entity) how 
can truth/being be apprehended by an agent? 
In the early twentieth century, the phenomenologist Max Scheler 
foresaw the advent of language bound arguments (Spader, 2002: 
295; cf. also Scheler, 1973:136-145). He proposed that phenomena 
themselves were not restricted by representational systems but 
existed independently of human-imposed symbols and categories 
(Spader, 2002:295). 
[The] philosopher, thirsting for the lived-experience of being, will 
above all seek to drink at the very sources in which the contents 
of the world reveal themselves. His reflective gaze rests only on 
that place where lived-experience and its object, the world, 
touch one another. (Scheler, 1973:138.) 
The very sources are the objects themselves, as they are present to 
the perceiver, unfiltered and raw. 
Something can be self-given only if it is no longer given merely 
through any sort of symbol; in other words, only if it is not 
„meant‟ as the mere „fulfillment‟ of a sign which is previously 
defined in some way or other. In this sense phenomenological 
philosophy is a continual desymbolization of the world. 
(Scheler, 1973:143.)  
The Schelerian experience is the phenomenological ephoché (Lutz 
& Thompson, 2003:38). It is the development and experience of an 
approach towards reality which is open to the direct presence of 
being by the awareness and bracketing of the worldviews, which 
undergird the human encounter with existence in the world (Lutz & 
Thompson, 2003:38).  
The embodied human being is engaged with the environment and 
the self through self-reflective consciousness. Western psychologi-
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cal explorations of consciousness describe three conscious states, 
namely wakefulness, dreaming, and sleeping (Rubia, 2009:2). To 
this division contemplative traditions add a fourth state of con-
sciousness, namely thoughtless awareness (Rubia, 2009:2). A bias 
has continued to be evident in the assumption that contemplation is 
necessarily religious, and thus not relevant to those outside faith 
traditions. While contemplation can be faith-based as evident in the 
Hindu, Buddhist, Judaeo-Christian, Sufi, and other faith traditions, it 
is not necessarily so (De Wit, 1991:17).23 Religious or not, contem-
plation is fundamentally human. 
It is argued in some psychological studies that contemplation leads 
to “thoughtless awareness” in the halting of “... the incessant 
thinking processes of the mind ...” (Rubia, 2009:2).24 In addition to 
mental silence, contemplation can lead to an awareness – sym-
bolically free – of the embodied state and its context (Rubia, 
2009:2). Such insightful understanding has a higher likelihood of oc-
curring when the conscious individual is in the state of mind faci-
litated by contemplation (Walsh, 2011:120).  
A prejudice against contemplation is apparent in psychology, for 
introspective processes were often discounted as means to obtain 
scientific accounts of subjective conscious experience (Thompson, 
2006). However, as part of what comprises the human experience, 
scientific pursuits like neurophenomenology place introspection and 
contemplation (a fruit of introspection) as “... a partner in the 
scientific investigation of consciousness” (Thompson, 2006:2).  
The core concern of psychological studies of contemplation ob-
viously relates to its psychological impact (De Wit, 1991:24). Studies 
across religious and secular contemplative traditions reveal remark-
able similarity in the product of the contemplative process. 
                                      
23 A secular, poetic interpretation of the contemplative moment was referred to by 
Alfred Lord Tennyson in his poem The ancient sage: 
[F]or more than once when I 
Sat all alone, revolving in myself 
The word that is the symbol of myself, 
The mortal limit of the Self was loosed, 
And past into the Nameless, as a cloud 
Melts into heavens (Tennyson, 2004:500). 
24 Similar studies have been undertaken by West (1987), De Wit (1991), Lutz & 
Thompson (2003), Rubia (2009), and Walsh (2011). 
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The result is that brief glimpses extend into continuous vision, 
novel perspectives become permanent metaperspectives, and 
new insights develop into enduring understandings ... certain 
functionally specific and higher states may be doorways 
through which wisdom – in the form of valuable insights, 
understandings, perspectives and resultant ways of life – can 
emerge and find expression. (Walsh, 2011:121.) 
Contemplatives make an ontological claim that contemplation pro-
vides “... insight into the fundamental nature of self and reality ...”, 
unmediated by concepts or cognition (Walsh, 2011:124). It is an 
awareness of what is without recourse to the categorisation of 
thoughts into symbolic entities. This awareness is, however, always 
from the subjective perspective (De Wit, 1991:68-69). As subjective 
experience there is no general experience that can be deemed con-
templative, it being an individual encounter between experience and 
being (De Wit, 1991:72). However, De Wit (1991:83) argues that it is 
not primarily knowledge production that the contemplative tradition 
seeks; instead its focus is on the creation of knowers. 
Contemplation is non-conceptual, which differs from meditation (de-
fined as conceptual in the conscious pondering over particular 
issues, objects, etc.) (De Wit, 1991:84). Scholars argued for 
syneidesis, referring to “... a way of seeing reality clearly, or seeing 
the truth without the veil of concepts” (De Wit, 1991:85; cf. also 
Aquinas, 1920, 1: Summa Theologica, Question 79, Art. 12). Here, 
knowledge is generated not so much depending on the absence of 
concepts, but neither with nor without concepts: a stance wherein 
the real is encountered but not limited in the use of symbols (De Wit, 
1991:86). To move beyond symbols, to desymbolise experience, to 
enter the ephoché 
… our thinking must proceed phemenologically, for only then is 
the world given to us concretely, and without symbols – such as 
„sense data‟, – that may eventually distort our primordial relation 
to a world, and lead us to conceive of things as they are implied 
by symbols and metaphors, rather than as they are given to a 
person (Kelly, 1997:146).  
The moment of experience beyond symbolic representation is the 
“originary moment” when reality is encountered in an unhampered 
manner (Peeters, 2004). This cannot be expressed symbolically, for 
when symbols are employed to describe the encounter with reality 
distance from being arises (Peeters, 2004). A frequent use of the 
methods of contemplation can assist the perceiver in coming to an 
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“... awareness of pure Being ...”, an unfettered knowledge of the way 
things are (West, 1987:13). 
This epistemology is different to scientific conceptual modes: objec-
tive testing and validity can be readily called into question (Walsh, 
2011:124). Yet, contemplation is not scientific and should not be 
measured against what it does not claim to be (De Wit, 1991:68-69). 
Even against science, though, neurophenomenological scholars 
such as Lutz and Thompson (2003:33) point out the fallible nature of 
perception and cognition in the development of conceptual under-
standings of what is observed and perceived. Caution is levelled 
against what can be known, but not against the reality of what is 
beheld: while the contemplative experience pushes the person to 
encounter truth, it cautions against binding or restricting the expe-
rience in terms of categorisation and symbolic representation, for 
truth is apart from both. 
The earlier work of Wittgenstein (specifically in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, 1922) – while possible to read in an antimetaphysical 
manner – supports the principal thesis of this article (Fann, 1971: 
26). Wittgenstein (1922:74) states: “The limits of my language mean 
the limits of my world.” The world being for Wittgenstein (1922:25), 
“... everything that is the case”. Hence at first reading, Wittgenstein 
proposes that what cannot be articulated in language is not the case 
for the perceiving subject.  
Viewed in the light of the Preface to the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 
1922) as well as to subsequent comments, the reading as eluci-
dated above is incorrect. In his exploration of natural language, 
Wittgenstein delineated statements into three categories, namely 
those which make sense, those that lack sense, and nonsensical 
propositions (Formosa, 2007). For the early work by Wittgenstein, it 
was only propositions that represent actual (or possible) “state[s] of 
affairs” that make sense (Formosa, 2007). “If a sign is not necessary 
then it is meaningless”, Wittgenstein (1922:36) states. The demar-
cation between what makes sense and what does not, for Witt-
genstein, is the meaning the statement has. And the only manner in 
which meaning can be determined is to ascertain whether or not the 
proposition shares commonalities with what “is the case” (Wittgen-
stein, 1922:25; cf. also Formosa, 2007).  
A proposition which cannot be expressed in language has no 
meaning, for the meaning is found in the language employed: 
whatever is beyond language “... will be simply nonsense” (Wittgen-
stein, 1922:23). This statement is founded in the assumption that 
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anything describable by using language can be done in a clear 
manner (Wittgenstein, 1922:23). 
In the earlier work by Wittgenstein, language represents the world to 
those who apprehend it.25 But these facts only tell us “... how the 
world is” (Wittgenstein, 1922:89). For Wittgenstein the very exis-
tence of the world is thus also a matter of importance, which he 
does not deem to be comprehendible in a sensible fashion through 
the propositions of science. The weight of the non-sensical, of the 
symbolically transcendent, comes to the fore towards the end of the 
Tractatus. “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself: it is 
the mystical.” (Wittgenstein, 1922:90.) 
The foundational-metaphysical problem of existence is not sensible 
to Wittgenstein (1922:26), for linguistically one cannot picture that 
which is the case in metaphysical propositions. Wittgenstein does 
not negate the existence of the metaphysical, however, clearly he 
conceives it to be of paramount importance, despite the non-sen-
sical nature of questions of existence. The Tractatus ends with the 
frequently quoted words of Wittgenstein (1922:90): “Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”  
Silence does, however, not imply ignoring the reality encountered. It 
implies an awareness of the existence of the non-sensical and 
knowledge of the inability to express that nonsense, which necessa-
rily transcends representation. The early Wittgenstein ends in being, 
silently – in what can be identified in terms of the above as con-
templation. 
5. Conclusion 
The demonstration has been sought that language – as a re-
presentational system – leads beyond linguistic confines such that 
the being of the entities to which language points may be partially 
grasped. Through language, meaning is afforded to the entities – be 
they material or introspective experiences. However, these repre-
sentations do not contain the fullness of the being which they re-
present. Thus, the argument is made that language limits the 
                                      
25 Wittgenstein (1922:28) states: 
We make to ourselves pictures of facts. The picture presents the facts 
... The picture is a model of reality. To the objects correspond in the 
picture the elements of the picture. The elements of the picture stand, 
in the picture, for the objects.  
Understanding beyond language: perceiving meaning in reality  
684   Koers 76(4) 2011:661-686 
ontology that can be known, proposing instead that contemplative 
moments of symbol-less attentiveness can provide ontological 
knowledge in human beings‟ awareness of being.  
Through the realist ontology of Saint Anselm the limits of language 
as an epistemological instrument were described. This led to the 
proposition that truth is unexperiencable, but that being/truth should 
not be closed off to the human being through the sole employment 
of language. Language does not contain the truth it signifies. It is 
only a representation of an ontological experience. The task the 
philosophically inclined are given is to apprehend being/truth despite 
its inability to be totally contained in any sensible language game. 
In transcending representational systems such as language, the 
human being can bring a part of human perception and cognition 
into synchronisation with the character of nature: not representative 
of something, as conceived in any symbolic system, but encoun-
tered as that which is.26 As the contemplative notes: 
How rich are nature‟s songs, how deep her silence! (De Mello, 
1990:324.) 
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